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EXPANDING THE CIVIL PRIVILEGE OF
BEING REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL
THROUGH THE PRESUMED PREJUDICE
DOCTRINE
Maurice Hew, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

On the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v Wainwright,' many
scholars are examining 2 the promise to not ration justice 3 by requiring
counsel to be appointed for the indigent for State crimes. 4 Yet, other
scholars are trying to expand Gideon's promise to all civil law
matters, 5 including immigration. 6
Providing free appointed

Maurice Hew, Jr., Associate Professor of Law and Director of Clinical
Legal Education, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University.
Board Certified, Immigration and Nationality Law, Texas Board of Legal Education.
This article was made possible through my Thurgood Marshall School of Law
summer research stipend. I would like to thank the University of the District of
Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law, my research assistants Mr. Brian
Rodriguez and Ms. Haley Reynolds, and the countless others who provided me
guidance with this article.
1 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2 See Bruce Courtade, Gideon at 50, A Clarion Still Muted, 92 MAR
Mich.Bar.J.14(2013) and Richie Eppink, "The Jokes on Us": Pausing to Reflect on
the 5 0 'hAnniversary of Gideon v Wainwright, 56 JAN Advocate(ldaho) 18 (2013).
3 On February 16, 1951, Chief Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit was
the keynote speaker for the 75th anniversary celebration of The Legal Aid Society of

New York. During that speech, he said: "Ifwe are to keep our democracy, there must
be one commandment: Thou shall not ration justice."
4 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5 See Judge Mark Juhas, On the Anniversary of Gideon, An Argument For
Free Civil Representation, 36-Sept L.A. Law 44(2013).
6 Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent
Residents, 122 Yale L.J. 2394(2013).
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immigration counsel for representation in secretive 7 civil immigration
removal proceedings would be ideal. However, for respondents who
are subjected to the mandatory deportation consequences of their
*9.
convictions,
immigration representation is impractical and serves
little purpose.' 0 A better approach is to have criminal counsel
simultaneously provide immigration representation by creating a
record of conviction to avoid removal proceedings in their entirety.
Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to
the "effective assistance of competent counsel"" which now
constitutionally mandates informed consideration of immigration
deportations.12 The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clauses' 3
7 See, Maria Sacchetti and Milton J. Valencia, Secret Courts Part 3:Courts
inside prisons, far from public view, BOSTON GLOBE, December 11,

2012,

http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2012/12/11/secret-courts-confused-and-isolatedmany-immigrants-are-assembly-line-deportation-detentioncenters/2qon3LVfLUQyzcIU6Enk7L/story.html. This is an interesting article on how
the "secret" immigration court is a 140 mile drive from Atlanta, GA.
8 The term "respondent" refers to an individual in removal or deportation
proceedings. See Immigration Court Practice Manual, Glossary, p.9 (rev. April 1,
2008).
Because the drastic measure of deportation or removal is now virtually
inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes, the importance of
accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more
important." Padilla v. Kentucky, U.S. 356, 356 (2010). The immigration grounds of
removal for criminal offenses are found at 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A), INA
§237(a)(2)(A). The term "conviction" means, with respect to an alien, a formal
judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been
withheld, where (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a
finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or
restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(48)(A), INA §
101(a)(48)(a).
10 See Erin B. Corcoran, Bypassing Civil Gideon: A Legislative Proposal to
Addressing the Rising Cost and Unmet Legal Needs of Unrepresented Immigrants,
115 W.VA.L.REv.643 (2012). In her article, Professor Corcoran writes that efforts to
establish the right to counsel in civil litigation have and likely will continue to be
unsuccessful.
1 McMann v Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
12 Informed consideration of possible deportation can only benefit both the
State and noncitizen defendants during the plea-bargaining process. Padilla v
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
13 "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
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guarantees a fair trial, but it is partially defined by the Sixth
Amendment' sl 4 Counsel Clauses;1 5 "The right to counsel is the right
to the effective assistance of counsel."' 6 These constitutional rights
allow inquiries into at least three different related topics: 1) the
constitutional right to free appointed counsel, 2) the effective
assistance of counsel, and 3) the role that the right to counsel plays in
the criminal justice system.
This article will primarily focus on the meaning of "effective
assistance of counsel," more particularly, the categorical inclusion of
effective immigration aid in the simultaneous preparation and trial of
the criminal case: a "newly"' 7 defined constitutional right. This article
revisits the role of the "presumed prejudice doctrine" as an avoidance
mechanism in pursuit of constitutionally acceptable "crimmigration"' 8 plea bargaining. If we can make criminal court
personnel more effective with respect to immigration issues, so that
creative plea bargains would lead to non-deportable offenses or where
the defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleads to a conviction which
only leads to presumptive mandatory deportation; possible collateral
results are reductions in the number of removal proceedings and postconviction appeals, petitions, and writs. As a practical matter,
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST Amend. V. (emphasis added).
14 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accuse shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counselfor his defence." U.S. CONST. Amend.
VI. (emphasis added).
I Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), citing the 5 th and 6 th
Amendments.
16 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
n.14 (1970).
17 Chaidez v. United States, No. 11-820, (Feb. 20, 2013).
While the Chaidez
majority held that the decision in Padilla v. Kentucky cannot be retroactively applied
to federal cases on collateral review, Padilla is still the constitutional mandate as of
March 31, 2010 into the future at the federal and state levels.
18
Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 367, 381 (2006); see also Carlos Moctezuma
Garcia
&
C6sar
Cuauht~moc
Garcia
Hernndez,
Crimmigration:
http://www.crlmmigration.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) (using the term "crimmigration" to denote the intersection of criminal and immigration laws).
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reducing the number of immigration removal proceedings should also
reduce financial burdens and promote judicial economy.
Informed considerations of possible deportations can only benefit
both the State and noncitizen defendants during the plea-bargaining
process.19 Recently, numerous convictions have been vacated on the
state and federal 2' levels, as criminal counsels' unprofessional
immigration errors prejudiced their clients. Criminal courts at the state
and federal levels have on-going due process obligation to inquire
whether the defendant's counsel is rendering or may render ineffective
immigration assistance during plea bargaining 22 and/or at the time of
the conviction. 23 "Criminal courts must also refrain from creating or
allowing any prejudice by foreclosing any criminal alien defendant's
claim that a criminal plea is 'unknowing and involuntary' for collateral
immigration related reasons." 24 Of course, counsel for the government
must not interfere with criminal defense counsel's constitutional
duty 2 5 to provide informed immigration representations and must not
conduct trials for criminal immigration defendants without due process
safeguards or presumptively prejudice the defendant.
This article uses the presumed prejudice doctrine as an avoidance

mechanism for vacating convictions in an effort to force the criminal
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct 1473, 1486(2010).
Padilla v. Com .381 S.W.3d 322 (KY.APP. 2012). "After a careful
consideration of the United States Supreme Court decision, we conclude that Padilla
demonstrated that if he had been properly informed of the immigration consequences
of his guilty plea, he would have insisted on going to trial and that his decision
would have been rational under the circumstances." Stated differently, in challenging
his guilty plea based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, Padilla had to
demonstrate that his counsel's ineffective performance affected the outcome of the
plea process such that he rationally would have insisted on a trial, not that an
acquittal was likely. Also see Ex parte Tanklevskaya, 361 S.W.3d 86, 97 (Tex. App.
2011) petition for discretionary review granted, judgment vacated, Ex parte
Tanklevskaya, 393 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) and abrogated by Ibarra v.
State, 01-12-00292-CR, 2013 WL 1163967 (Tex. App. Mar. 21, 2013), petition for
discretionary review refused (Nov. 20, 2013).
21 See United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630 (3 rd Cir. 2011) and MontesFlores v. United States, 2013 WL428 024 (Feb. 4, 2013).
22 See discussion of Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012) and Lafler v.
Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012), infra, p. 6.
23 Plea bargaining is a critical phase of litigation. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52 (1985) (holding that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to
challenges to guilty pleas based on the ineffective assistance of counsel).
24 Montes-Flores v. United States, 2013 WL428024 (Feb. 4, 2013).
25 Shilliger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132 ( th
10 Cir. 1995).
19

20
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courts and attorneys to be more "immigration effective," thereby
alleviating some pressures for available immigration counsel in
subsequent removal proceedings. The bookend results should produce
alien 2 6 defendants, who will plead to a criminal offense that will not
lead to the deportation consequence or defendants who knowingly and
voluntarily plead to a criminal offense where immigration removal
was the only presumptively mandatory result. Either situation
eliminates the need for immigration counsel.
Left in between would be those seeking immigration relief because
they pled to a conviction with a possible (not presumptively
mandatory) deportation consequence. This equals approximately 4,700
respondents nationwide, 2 7 of the 410,000 relief applications received
annually 28 or about one percent of the total.29 Here, the author hopes
that more immigration-effective criminal personnel will result in
lessened financial concerns for the government in the backend
immigration removal proceedings by eliminating removal proceedings
or having respondents agree to their removal as opposed to prolonged
immigration detention 30 and costly litigation.31
This article begins by providing a cursory review of the presumed
prejudice doctrine in the criminal, immigration, and post-"crimmigration" context. Then, the article applies the presumed prejudice
doctrine to post-Padilla actual denial, constructive denial, state
While I find the statutory term "alien" offensive, the term means, "Any
person not a citizen or national of the United States." 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(3), INA
§101(a)(43).
27 The United States Department of Justice Statistical Yearbook for 2012
reveals that 3,919 applications for cancellation of removal were granted and 794
applications for 212(c) were granted for a total of 4,713 cases. Executive Office for
Immigration Review FY 2012 Statistical Year Book, Table 16 p. R3 (Feb. 2013).
28
A total of 410,753 immigration matters were received in FY 2012.
Executive Office for Immigration Review FY 2012 Statistical Year Book, p.B7 (Feb.
2013).
26

29

4,713 of 410,753 = 1.1%.

See Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right
to
Appointed Counsel For Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal
Proceedings. 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63 (2012). This article is on prolonged
immigration detention for those challenging removal orders.
31 Immigration and Customs Enforcement deputy director Kumar Kibble told
Congress that it costs approximately $12,500 to deport an undocumented immigrant.
My guess is that $12,500 is the floor insofar as an individual with a criminal
conviction subject to mandatory detention should be more expensive to deport than
one that is simply an undocumented immigrant. See http://blog.chron.com/
immigration/20 11/01/ice-reveals-cost-for-deporting-each-illegal-immigrant/.
30
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interference, and conflicts of interest cases. It ends by concluding that
the door to the right to counsel has been unknowingly opened in the
civil immigration context, partly at the expense to the government
through the use of criminal attorneys in the frontend with the
presumedprejudice doctrine as a possible key.
I. THE PRESUMED PREJUDICE DOCTRINE: A CURSORY REVIEW
A. Establishment of the Doctrine: Cronic and Strickland

On May 14, 1984, the Supreme Court issued twin Sixth
Amendment effective assistance of counsel cases, United States v.
Cronic32 and Strickland v. Washington.33 In Cronic, the Supreme
Court opined that a "trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a
critical stage of his trial." 34 In a footnote following that sentence, the
Court explained that the presumption of prejudice was appropriate
"when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting
the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding." 35 The Cronic
court also identified presumed prejudice when counsel entirely fails to
subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, which
makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable. 36
Moreover, Cronic identified situations where "[c]ircumstances of such
magnitude may be present on some occasions when although counsel
is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any
lawyer, even a fully competent one could provide effective assistance
is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate." 3 7
3
In Strickland,

the Court reaffirmed the presumed prejudice

doctrine for the actual and constructive denial of counsel, 39 but also
held that prejudice was presumed when counsel is burdened by certain
conflicts of interests40 and in cases of state interference with the
defense. 4 1 While the Strickland Court reaffirmed and recognized the

3

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659.
Id. n.25.
d.at 659.
Id. at 659-660 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
Strickland,466 U.S. 668.
Id.

40

Id.

32

33
34
3
36

37
3

41 Id.
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presumed prejudice doctrine,42 the decision is better known for
requiring prejudice affirmatively with its well-worn two-part test for a
Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel violation:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said
that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a
breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result

unreliable. 4 3
In Hill v. Lockhart,4 the Court held that to prove prejudice, the
defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that but for
counsel's errors he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial. In Lockhart v. Fretwell,45 the Court referred
to Hill's prejudice standard of review as outcome-determinative tests.
In Padilla v. Kentucky,4 6 the Court clarified the Hill prejudice
standard, as not necessarily requiring an acquittal after a hypothetical
trial; but "[a]reasonable probability exists if the defendant convinces
the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been
rational under the circumstances." 4 7 More recently, the Court
expressed its willingness to entertain new prejudice standards 4 8 such
as a "better plea bargain test." 4 9

42

46

Id.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
Padilla,559 U.S. 356, 371-2 (2010).
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Id.

43
4
45

Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012).
See Richard E. Meyers, II, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel:
Rereading Cronic and Strickland In Light of Padilla,Frye, and Lafler, 45 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 299 (2012).
48

49
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On March 21, 2012, in the companion cases of Missouri v. Frye,5 o
and Lafler v. Cooper, ' the Court created "plea bargaining law" and
recognized Sixth Amendment constitutional violations during the time
of the negotiations or consideration of the plea. For example, where a
defendant misses out on or rejects plea bargains because of bad legal
advice or no advice, the defense counsel's performance can lead to a
constitutional violation. In order to evidence prejudice, the defendant
has the burden of showing that he or she missed out on a better plea
bargain because of his or her lawyer's errors. 52 The movant must also
establish that there is a reasonable probability that the prosecution and
the court would have accepted the better plea offer. While Frye and
Cooper were decided in the criminal contexts without any
consideration of immigration, the Court made numerous references to
Padilla and expressed its willingness to consider other prejudice
standards insofar as Hill does not provide the sole means for
demonstrating prejudice.5 3
A failure to prove either deficient performance or actual prejudice
is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 54 As such, savvy
litigants should be prepared to alternatively plead presumed and
affirmative prejudice, and introduce new prejudice standards, knowing
that post-conviction relief motions are often denied for a failure to
prove prejudice affirmatively, without reviewing an attorney's
performance (Strickland's Prong 1).55 Combined, Cronic56 and
Strickland5 1 provide at least six scenarios where prejudice is presumed

50

Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399.

Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012).
Maurice Hew, Jr., Constitutionalization of the Plea Bargaining Process
after Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, 2012 Lexis Emerging Issues Analysis
6298 (April 2012). In this piece, I provide a hypothetical.
5 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012).
5
52

54

Strickland,466 U.S. 668, 696.

55Id.

Cronic, 466 U.S. 648.
" Strickland,466 U.S. 668, 687, 696(1984).
56
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and need not be proven affirmatively5 8 in the traditional criminal
context.
B. The CriminalPresumedPrejudiceDoctrine and Civil Removal
Proceedings

The right to counsel in immigration proceedings does not arise
from the Sixth Amendment but is grounded in statute 60 and is arguably
recognized by the Fifth Amendment.61 The statute provides: "[i]n any
removal proceeding before an immigration judge and in any appeal
proceedings before the Attorney General from any such removal
proceedings, the persons concerned shall have the privilege of being
represented (at no expense to the government) by such counsel,
authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose." 62
While the right to counsel in immigration proceedings was also
arguably protected by the Fifth Amendment, its scope has recently
been in dispute.
In Matter of Compean,6 3 decided just days prior to the expiration
of George W. Bush's second term as President, Attorney General
Mukasey held that aliens in removal proceedings had a statutory right
to counsel, but the Constitution did not afford an alien a "redo" of the
removal proceedings based on the availability or a deficiency of
respondent's counsel.6 4 Further, while the Fifth Amendment
(1) When counsel was totally absent; (2) constructively denied the
assistance of counsel; (3) counsel is present but is prevented from assisting the
accused during a critical stage of the proceeding; (4) there is a state interference with
the representation; (5) counsel does not adversarial test the prosecution's case; and
(6) conflicts of interest.
59 I refer to the traditional criminal context as a criminal proceeding which
previously excluded immigration.
60 Immigration & Nationality Act § 292, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1362 (2006).
61 No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation. U.S. CONsT. Amend. V.
62 Immigration & Nationality Act § 292, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1362 (2006).
63 Matter of Enrique Salas Compean 1, 24 I&N Dec. 710
(A.G. 2009).
58

64

Id.
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guaranteed fair immigration proceedings, it only extended to violations
committed by the government and not by respondent's counsel.65
Eric Holder, Attorney General under President Obama, in his first
published decision, in Matter o Compean II,66 vacated Mukasey's
order in Matter of Compean I. It reinstated the Fifth Amendment
right to counsel for respondents in removal proceedings, but it did not
create the right to appointed counsel in immigration proceedings.
Attorney General Holder further reinstated Matter of Lozada68 and
Matter of Assaad,69 decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals
purporting to define the procedural standards for ineffective assistance
of counsel claims in immigration proceedings. In 2010, the Executive
Office for Immigration Review complied with Attorney General
Holder's order in Matter of Compean 1170 and issued government
regulations ' to prescribe the professional conduct of immigration
practitioners in immigration proceedings. In Matter of M-A-M, 7 2 the
Board of Immigration Appeals recognized Fifth Amendment due
process concerns for respondents who lacked the sufficient
competency to proceed and gave immigration judges the authority to
conduct evaluations for appropriate safeguards necessary to ensure that
immigration proceedings are sufficiently fair. 7
With the recognition of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in
immigration proceedings, the issue of prejudice is a relevant inquiry.
The Board of Immigration Appeals has applied a "harmless error
rule" 74 and rejects inherent prejudice.75 Despite the Board of
Immigration Appeals' decisions, the presumed prejudice doctrine is

evolving in the Fifth Amendment civil immigration removal context
and the Circuit Courts have jurisdiction over the Board and the

Id. Unless Respondent was appointed counsel by the government.
Matter of Enrique Salas Compean II, 25 I&N Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009).
67 Compean I, 24 I&N Dec.
710.
68 Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA
1988).
69 In re Bassel Nabih Assaad, 23 I&N Dec. 553 (BIA
2003).
7o Compean II, 25 I&N Dec. 1.
71 8 CFR § 1003.101. et seq.
72 Matter of M-A-M, 25 I&N Dec. 474 (BIA 2011).
73
These safeguards include acquiescing to a "custodian" or next of kin
representing the respondent and an immigration judge creating a record, but does not
necessarily include the forced appointment of a licensed attorney.
74 In re Assaad, 23 I&N Dec. 553.
7 Id.
65

66
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immigration courts that are located in the specific circuit. 7 6 Currently,
there is a split in the Circuit Courts with the Ninth Circuit bringing the
number of reviewing courts to 5-3 in favor of presumed prejudice for
certain immigration petitioners.
Mario Montes-Lopez, a native and citizen of El Salvador
petitioned the Ninth Circuit for review of his removal order.7 7 MontesLopez, an asylum applicant, sought a continuance of his merits hearing
as his attorney failed to appear because his law license was
78
temporarily suspended. The immigration judge denied the motion to
continue because Montes-Lopez had knowledge about his lawyer's
license suspension approximately eleven days before the merits
hearing and the judge determined that Montes-Lopez was not diligent
in advising the court of the situation earlier. 7 9 Unrepresented by
counsel, Montes-Lopez was forced to proceed with the asylum merits
hearing resulting in a denial of his asylum application. 80
The Ninth Circuit agreed and held that the immigration judge
violated the statutory right to counsel by forcing Montes-Lopez to
proceed without his counsel. 8 ' The government argued that MontesLopez needed to prove prejudice affirmatively. Because this was a
case of first impression, the Ninth Circuit looked to its sister circuits
which were split on the issue; specifically, the Second, Third, Seventh
and D.C. Circuits presumed prejudice while the Fourth, Fifth, and
Tenth Circuits require an affirmative showing of prejudice. Following
the Second Circuit's reasoning that automatic reversal would force the
government to follow its own rules and promote judicial economy,
prejudice was presumed in Montes-Lopez's case. 82
Dismissing the government's arguments, the Ninth Circuit opined
that prejudice should be presumed because 1) the Fifth Amendment
right to a full and fair hearing was applicable in addition to the
statutory immigration right to counsel; and 2) the denial of counsel
fundamentally affects the whole of the proceedings as opposed to
counsel who is simply ineffective. Further, the Ninth Circuit reasoned
The Board is bound to follow the ruling of a United States district court in
matters arising within the same jurisdiction, Matter of Amado and Monteiro, 13 I&N
Dec. 179 (BIA 1969).
7 Montes-Lopez v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2012).
76

78

Id.

79Id.
80

Id.

81 Id.
82 Montes-Lopez

v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2012).

56

that while the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not apply to civil
immigration proceedings, it saw no reason why the logic of its Sixth
Amendment decisions should not guide the decision in Fifth
Amendment civil immigration proceedings.
Here, the removal order was reversed and the matter was remanded
to the Board of Immigration Appeals and from there to the lower
immigration court. The instruction to the prosecutor and court is to
protect the Due Process rights of the immigration respondent." Had
the immigration prosecutor or the court moved for a continuance,
rescheduling the proceedings for Montez-Lopez's lawyer to appear
after his suspension, the proceedings would not have had to be
repeated and the matter would have been resolved more economically
and without appellate review.
II. THE PRESUMED PREJUDICE DOCTRINE, PADILLA, AND
THE "CR-IMMIGRATION" CONTEXT

A.

ConstitutionallyPermittedDenial of Counsel Leading to Presumed
Prejudice

The Sixth Amendment is not violated where criminal counsel is
not appointed and incarceration is not actually imposed. In
Argersinger v. Hamlin,84 Petitioner was charged in Florida with
carrying a concealed weapon, an offense punishable by imprisonment
up to six months, a $1,000 fine or both. Petitioner was unrepresented
during a bench trial, convicted, and sentenced to serve ninety days in
86
85
jail.s Following
Duncan v. Louisiana, the Florida Supreme Court
held that similar to the right to trial by jury, the right to counsel was
only guaranteed for non-petty offenses punishable by more than six
months of imprisonment. 87 The Supreme Court reversed,
distinguishing between the right to trial by jury and the right to
counsel, holding that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty,

83 Id.
84 Argersinger

v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).

8 Id.
86 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
1 Argersinger, 407 U.S. 25.
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misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at
trial."
In Scott v. Illinois,89 the Court granted certiorari to resolve a
conflict amongst state and lower federal courts regarding the proper
application of Argersinger.90 Following a bench trial conviction for
theft, Petitioner Scott was sentenced to pay fifty dollars. 9' While the
applicable Illinois statute set the maximum penalty for such offense at
a $500 fine, one year in jail or both, Scott was not provided with
appointed counsel at trial.92 Scott argued that he was entitled to
counsel inasmuch as a sentence of imprisonment was authorized even
though it was not imposed. The Court held that the Sixth and
Fourteenth amendments to the Constitution require only that no
indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
unless the State afforded the right to counsel. Thus, the Court formed a
bright line rule requiring counsel when incarceration is actually
imposed and not requiring counsel where incarceration is simply

authorized. 93
In Texas, the offense of possession of drug paraphernalia 94 a class
C misdemeanor is only punishable by a fine, 9 5 so a constitutionally
permissible conviction can result where counsel was not appointed. 9 6
In fact, in Texas' Harris County 97 Justice of the Peace courts,
individuals are frequently charged with possession of drug
paraphernalia and are not appointed counsel.98 Pursuant to
88

Id.

Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
90 Argersinger,407 U.S. 25.
91 Scott, 440 U.S. 367.
89

92

9

id.
Id.

94 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.125 (d).
9 TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.23, An individual adjudged guilty of a class C misdemeanor shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $500.00.
96 On March 15, 2013, 1 went to a Harris County Court and spoke to a justice
of the peace who advised that his jurisdiction included class C Texas misdemeanors
and that he didn't believe that the right to counsel was applicable. While I am not
denigrating the office of the Justices of the Peace in Texas, they are not required to
have law degrees and a discussion of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments with the
justice was strained. He might have also been tired because it was the end of the day
and I was advised that he handled over 300 cases that day.
9 Harris County is the third largest county in the United States and the largest
county in Texas. Harris County includes Houston, Texas. http://www.census.gov/
popest/data/counties/totals/2012/CO-EST2012-01 .html
98 Scott, supra note 91.
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immigration laws, a conviction for a criminal offense relating to a
controlled substance renders one deportable unless the conviction was
for a single offense of possession of marijuana of less than thirty
grams. 9 9 Possession of drug paraphernalia has been determined to be
necessarily related to a controlled substance conviction and a
deportable offense. 00 Moreover, the immigration laws require the
mandator detention of aliens' convicted of controlled substances
offenses I 2 without the availability of bond. Where the immigration
court backlogs average 504 days for a case to be adjudicated,103 it is
possible for a person convicted of drug paraphernalia in Texas without
counsel to be advised that only a criminal fine would result, and
mandatorily serve an average of 504 days in an immigration jail while
waiting for their immigration court proceeding on the backend.
I would argue that this actual denial of counsel is presumed
prejudice resulting in a denial of due process leading to a reversal of
these convictions. In Landon v. Plasencia,104 and Zadvydas v Davisios
the Supreme Court held that the due process clause applies to all
persons within the United States, including aliens, regardless of
whether their presence in the United States is lawful, or temporary.
Moreover, immigration detention, albeit civil, is arguably a liberty
interest.106 In this scenario, the court should make an effort to appoint
criminal counsel for these defendants to avoid presumptive prejudice
and due process concerns, especially where immigration detention is
mandatory 0 7 and not simply authorized.
B. Failureto Advise CriminalDefendants ofImmigration Consequences
Prejudice-anda Constructive Denialof Counsel
is Presumed
99 Immigration and Nationality Act §237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 USC §1227(a)(2)(B)

(i) (2006).
100 Luu-Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2000) and Barraza v. Mukasey, 519
F.3d 388 (7 " Cir. 2008).

and Nationality Act § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006).
Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(c)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B)

101 Immigration
102

(2006).

103 http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court-backlog/ (last reported February 28, 2013).
104 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
105 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
106 Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law; Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. Rev. 1625
(1992), Strickland, supra note 38, at 1655-56, Zadvydas, supra note 112.
107 Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(c); 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006).
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Perhaps, the most well-known case of presumed prejudice
categorized as the constructive denial of counsel is Burdine v.
Johnson. 08 During the guilt/innocence phase of Burdine's murder
trial, his court-appointed counsel repeatedly slept during the trial.109
Based on evidence that "defense counsel repeatedly dozed and/or
actually slept during substantial portions of Burdine's capital murder
trial so that defense counsel was, in effect, absent", the habeas court
concluded that a showing of prejudice in accordance with Strickland't0
was not required."' Accordingly, the circuit court recommended that
habeas relief be granted on Burdine's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. 112 The Supreme Court eventually denied certiorari. 113
In Padilla v. Kentucky, 114 the Supreme Court held that the
performance of Padilla's lawyer fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness for affirmative misadvice. Specifically, Padilla's
"actual counsel" told him that he would not be deported as a result of
his state drug distribution charge in Kentucky because he had been in
the United States for so long." 5 Justice Stevens provided that any
attorney reading the text of the statute should have known that
pleading guilty to drug distribution would lead to the presumptively
mandatory deportation consequence. This lead to a finding that
counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient.' 16
In part, the government agreed that affirmative misadvice fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness 117 but argued that
muteness-or an attorney not saying anything at all-would not lead
to a constitutional violation." 8 The Supreme Court disagreed and held
that affirmative misadvice and muteness, or an omission of
immigration considerations following a conviction, would constitute
constitutionally deficient representation.11 9 However, the Supreme
Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001).
Id.
110 Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
.. Burdine, 262 F.3d 336.
112 Id.
113 Cockrell v. Burdine, 535 U.S.
1120 (2002).
114 Padilla,559 U.S.
356.
108

109

115 Id.
116

117

Id.
Padilla,559 U.S. 356, 369.

"' Padilla,559 U.S. 356, 369-71.
119 Id.
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Court did not illustrate "muteness" and remanded to the Kentucky
Supreme Court to determine whether Padilla had been prejudiced. 2 0
One such case of attorney muteness as ineffectiveness leading to
presumed prejudice is State v. Ramirez. 121 Here, the Court of Appeals
for the State of New Mexico not only relied on Padilla,but also on a
New Mexico precedential decision, State v. ParedeZ.122 In 2009,
Ramirez filed a writ of coram nobis1 23 to vacate a 1997 conviction for
possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
concealing his identity.124 Ramirez argued that his court-appointed
counsel failed to advise him about any immigration consequences of
pleading guilty.12 5 Moreover, because the plea was nine months after a
change in the immigration laws which removed any discretionary
relief available for those who committed any offenses related to drug
paraphernalia, Ramirez was prejudiced. It should also be noted that the
State of New Mexico did not contradict the presumed prejudice
assertion.
The immigration muteness standard should equate to the
constructive denial of counsel which should also meet the presumed
prejudice standard requiring a reversal of a conviction. While I would
agree that presumptive prejudice for constructive denial cases should
be more difficult to prove than actual denial of counsel cases, the
Cronicl2 6 and Stricklandl2 7 majorities hold that either the constructive
denial and actual denial of counsel cases can meet the presumed
Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W. 3d 322 (Ky. App. 2012). After a
careful consideration of the United States Supreme Court decision, we conclude that
Padilla demonstrated that if he had been properly informed of the immigration
consequences of his guilty plea, he would have insisted on going to trial and that his
decision would have been rational under the circumstances. Stated differently, in
challenging his guilty plea based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, Padilla had
to demonstrate that his counsel's ineffective performance affected the outcome of the
plea process such that he rationally would have insisted on a trial, not that an
acquittal was likely.
121 State v. Ramirez, 278 P.3d 569 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
122 State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799 (N.M. 2004).
123 The writ of coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy available to a plaintiff
no longer in custody who seeks to vacate a criminal conviction in circumstances
where the plaintiff can demonstrate civil disabilities as a consequence of the
conviction and the challenged error is of sufficient magnitude to justify extraordinary
relief. Jimenez v. Trominski, 91 F.3d 767 (5th Cir. 1996).
120

124

125
126
127

Ramirez, 278 P.3d 569.
Id.

Cronic, 466 U.S. 648.

Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
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prejudice standard. Moreover, while the Supreme Court has instructed
lower courts to give attorneys great performance discretion in the
representation of their clients,128 I can think of no legal strategy where
an attorney could argue that silence as to the risk of deportation
following a conviction would be in the best interests of the client and
meet some legal representational objective.
C. Fast Track JurisdictionProsecutionsas a State Interference with
Counsel and/orLack ofAdversarial Testing Leading to
PresumedPrejudice.

In Strickland,12 9 the Court identifies state interference with the
defense and lack of adversarial testing by the defense as presumed
prejudice and cites to its twin precedent Cronic' 30 for authority. In
turn, Cronic' ' cites to Davis v. Alaska,132 a case where no specific
showing of prejudice was necessary because the petitioner had been
denied the opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. In
Shilliger v. Haworth,13 3 prejudice was also presumed because the
prosecution violated defendant Haworth's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel by purposefully becoming privy to attorney-client confidential
information without a legitimate justification for doing so. 134
According to United States v. Mejia,135 fast-track programs
originated in the Southern District of California and later spread to
other districts along the southwest border, where the number of illegal
re-entry cases was overwhelming the capacity to prosecute violators.
The United States Attorneys in those districts created the programs
that offered defendants who committed illegal reentry after deportation
128

Id.
Id.
130 Cronic,466 U.S. 648.
129

131 Id.

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
13 Shilliger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1995).
134 Id., Haworth was in custody pending trial on a Wyoming offense for
assault and battery. Because Haworth was in custody, his attorney arranged to have
several trial preparatory sessions with Haworth in the trial courtroom on the
condition that a deputy sheriff was present. During the course of the trial it was
apparent that the prosecutor learned from the deputy sheriff of the trial preparatory
sessions and the substance of the conversations between the defendant, Haworth and
his defense counsel. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
prejudice was presumed.
13 U.S. v. Mejia, 461 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2006).
132
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offensesl36 an array of options, such as plea agreements and
recommendations for reduced sentences. These options were presented
in return for the defendants' waivers of various rights including:
indictment by a grand jury, trial by jury, presentation of a pre-sentence
report, and appellate review of the sentence. 3 7
United States v. Juarez'3 8 is a recent fast-track jurisdiction
prosecution case. In 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit granted Luis Fernando Juarez's 139 motion for postconviction relief,14 0 finding that his trial counsel's unprofessional
errors affirmatively prejudiced him within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment's right to the effective assistance of counsel. Juarez's
counsel failed to gather necessary facts from Juarez's mother to
research a United States' citizenship claim.141 Juarez's counsel also
erroneously advised him, a United States citizen, to plead guilty to two
criminal offenses,14 2 for which he was not guilty, as the criminal
offenses were only reserved for aliens. As a result, Juarez was
burdened with nearly six years of needless criminal litigation,14 3 false
136

Immigration and Nationality Act § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006).

137 Mejia, 461 F.3d 158.
138 U.S. v. Juarez, 672 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2012).
139 1 do not know Mr. Juarez but I used his facts

as a foundation to complete
this article. I also do not pass judgment on any of his conduct. The record reveals
that LFJ was convicted on August 1, 2002 for possession of cocaine. See, Juarez,
672 F.3d 381, 390. The Court of appeals held that counsel performed deficiently in
failing to research and investigate the facts and law concerning derivative citizenship
defense, and defendant was prejudiced by deficient performance. Id.
140 On September 20, 2007, Mr. Juarez filed a timely pro se motion for postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the Houston District of the Southern
District of Texas. Juarez, 672 F.3d 381, 384. A 28 U.S.C. §2255 motion attacks a
sentence and is a request for a new trial. When the court issued its decision to reverse
and remand on February 24, 2012, the motion had been in litigation for nearly four
and one-half years.
141 Immigration and Nationality Act § 321, 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(1999).
142 On March 15, 2006, a federal grand jury in the Houston Division
of the
Southern District of Texas returned a two count indictment: (1) charging that Juarez
lied about his United States Citizenship on a Firearms transaction record form which
Juarez completed while attempting to purchase a handgun in Houston, Texas in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 911 and (2) illegal reentry into the United States after
deportation following a conviction for an aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1326(a)&(b)(2). Juarez was sentenced to thirty-six months on the first count and
forty-two months on the second count to run concurrently. Juarez, 672 F.3d 381,
381.
143 On March 15, 2006, a federal grand jury in the Houston Division of the
Southern District of Texas returned a two-count indictment. The court granted LFJ's
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imprisonment,1 44 immigration removal proceedings, and erroneous
physical removal to Mexico.14 5 Proving prejudice affirmatively or
Strickland's 4 6 second prong to vacate Juarez's alien-based
convictions was unjustified.
While Juarez's counsel's competencel 4 7 and diligence 4 8 were
found to be constitutionally deficient, the appellate court failed to fault
the trial court and government prosecutors. Juarez's situation was
easily preventable. It is estimated that one percent or 4,000 of the
400,000 so-called aliens who are deported annually are actually United
States citizens. 149 While the government knows that it erroneously
deports about 4,000 United States citizens' 5 0 annually and have settled
lawsuits following erroneous removals and prosecutions, prosecutors
primarily rely on erroneous removal orders and do not necessarily do
their own factual findings in this streamlined process. 151 Prosecutors
need to re-evaluate their fast track jurisdiction practices and allow
procedural safeguards such as the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to
serve their purposes instead of erroneously convicting United States'
citizens of alien-based crimes.152
motion on February 24, 2012. One might also reach the conclusion that LFJ
acquisition of United States citizenship was automatically derived on June 18, 1999
when his mother acquired United States citizenship. Juarez, 672 F.3d 381, 384. The
period froml999 - 2012 would equate to nearly thirteen years of needless litigation.
144 The minute entry reveals that on March 20, 2006, LFJ made an appearance
and was held for a bond hearing to be held on March 22, 2006. The minute entries
further reveal that he pled guilty on May 12, 2006 and was remanded to the custody
of the U.S. Marshals Service.
145
The record reveals that LFJ's order of deportation was issued on
September 25, 2002 and executed on October 12, 2002. Juarez, 672 F.3d 381, 385.
146 Strickland,466 U.S. 668.
147 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2011) A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation necessary for the representation.
148 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2011) A lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.
149 Ted Robbins, In the Rush to Deport, Expelling U.S. Citizens, NAT'L. PUB.
RADIO (October 24, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/10/24/141500145/inthe-rush-to-deport-expelling-u-s-citizens.
150
See Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining And
Deporting United States Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 606 (2011).
'' Immigration and Nationality Act § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006).
152 After being detained for fifty-one days by the United States Immigration
and Customs Enforcement Division of the Department of Homeland Security
("ICE"), Mark Daniel Lyttle ("Lyttle"), a United States citizen with diminished
mental capacity, was flown to Hidalgo, Texas, transported to the Mexican border,
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For example, prosecutors and courts should grant defense counsel
more time to research and investigate claims of alienage rather than
fast track prosecutions. Best practices do not dictate reliance on
immigration court orders of removal as conclusive proof that the
person ordered removed is an alien when 4,000 erroneous orders of
removal based on alienage are issued annually. Moreover, it should be
noted removal orders are not only erroneous for alienage but for other
reasons such as expedited removals.153 Under the circumstances,
courts should and have questioned this practice.
In his Padillaconcurrence, Justice Alito acknowledges how hard it
is for criminal defense counsel to determine whether the client is an
alien.154 Where the government has the burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the individual is in fact an alien, defense counsel
must adversarially test the prosecution's case and cannot rely on its
client or presume that a previous deportation order answers this legal
question of law. Juarez's counsel failed to ask the right questions
because he was not knowledgeable of nationality law. Here, Juarez's
United States citizenship was an affirmative defense to his two
convictions, and the criminal magistrate and the district judge both
expected Juarez to prove prejudice affirmatively and then proceeded to
deny his petition when he could not prove affirmative prejudice.
Where the appointed defense counsel was not afforded time to
adversarially test the prosecutions' alienage claim and is later blamed
for failing to investigate, the prosecution and court must also share
some of the blame for creating fast track jurisdictions leading to
presumptive prejudice.
D.

Conflicts ofInterest as PresumedPrejudice

forced to disembark, and sent off on foot into Mexico with only three dollars in his
pocket. Wearing his prison-issued jump suit from the Stewart Detention Center, a
privately managed ICE facility in Georgia, and speaking no Spanish, Lyttle
wandered around Central America for 125 days, sleeping in the streets, staying in
shelters, and being imprisoned and abused in Mexico, Honduras, and Nicaragua
because he had no identity or proof of citizenship. Ultimately, Lyttle found his way
to the United States Embassy in Guatemala, where an Embassy employee helped him
contact his family in the United States to arrange for his return home. Lyttle v. U.S.,
867 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1272 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
15 See also, 8 U.S.C. § 1225; INA § 235. Erin M. O'Callaghan, Expedited
Removal and Discrimination in the Asylum Process: The Use of HumanitarianAid
as a Political Tool, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747 (2002).
154 Padilla,559 U.S. 356.
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The Strickland Court'5 5 held that prejudice was presumed when
counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest, particularly
loyalty, and referenced Cuyler v Sullivan.156 While Cuylerl57 related to
multiple concurrent client representations, other conflicts of interests
exist, such as a lawyer's personal interests that are in conflict with
their clients' interests.15 8 For example in Winkler v Keane,15 9 the
Second Circuit Court found a conflict of interest resulting in presumed
prejudice where an attorney would receive a fee of $25,000 only after
a jury's not guilty verdict. The Circuit Court found that the attorney
had a disincentive to enter into plea negotiations and that the fee
agreement was materially limiting.160
Pre-Padilla,161 some lawyers avoided providing immigration
advisals relating to a criminal conviction by failing to research the
immigration ramifications of a conviction 1622 and/or by limiting their
scope of representation to only provide criminal advice to the
exclusion of immigration law.'63 In Padilla,164 the Solicitor General
argued for defense counsel's muteness to be viewed as
constitutionally-permissible performance regarding immigration
advisals which the Supreme Court dismissed as indistinguishable from
unconstitutional affirmative misadvice.165 Moreover, while the Padilla
majority requires criminal counsel to provide immigration advice,16 6
Justices Alito and Roberts' concurrences would recommend a lesser
burden or for the criminal attorneys to simply advise their clients to
contact other counsel or immigration counsel for immigration
advice. Regardless, criminal counsel have a new duty that they
cannot avoid once they undertake a representation. Unfortunately,
155
156
157

Strickland,466 U.S. 668.
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
Id.

'
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7.
15 Winkler v Keane, 7 F.3d 304 (2d Cir.1993).
160 Id.
161 Padilla,559

U.S. 356.
See, Jenny M. Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Convictions, Silence and Misinformation in the Plea
Process, 95 IOWA L. REv. 119 (2009).
163 Padilla,559 U.S.
356.
164 Id.
162

165
166

Id.
Id.
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I predict that Padillawill not be accepted and followed until "enough"

convictions are vacated.1 67
Where an attorney remains mute, not only can this be a
constructive denial of counsel,16 8 but a possible conflict of interest
which can also equate to presumed prejudice. While a criminal defense
counsel can develop many reasons for remaining mute as to the
immigration consequences of a plea, included in a lawyer's lack of
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation is the implicit violation of the lawyer's loyalty to a
client. An attorney failing to investigate leads to a Sixth Amendment
violation.169 Even though the prosecutor and the court cannot account
for every attorney's error and not every attorney error will rise to an
unreliable or invalid plea, a court sua sponte or a prosecutor should
simply advise a defendant that they have a right to counsel and that the
counsel is supposed to provide immigration advice.' 70
Additionally, while the Padilla majority would require criminal
counsel's immigration advisals, Justices Alito and Roberts would limit
the scope of representation by a criminal lawyer to the direct criminal
consequences of the plea and have the defendant hire an immigration
attorney for immigration matters.171 I believe that many criminal
attorneys agree with Justices Alito and Roberts and have referred out
immigration cases to other attorneys and that it will take time for a
criminal defense attorney to understand that immigration
representation can no longer be referred out because immigration law
and criminal law is inextricably intertwined.
While the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility permit the
limiting of the scope of representation where it is reasonable under the
Montes-Flores v. U.S., 2013 WL 428024 (S.D. Ind. Feb.4, 2013), is a
Sixth Amendment case arising after Padilla. See Steven Zeidman, Padilla v
Kentucky, Sound and Fury, or Transformative Impact a factual basis 39 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 203 (2011).
167

168 Zeidman, supra note 182, at 15-17.
169 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
170 The prosecutor should be expected to know

the pending criminal charge
and whether the pending criminal charge makes one statutorily subject to removal.
Of course, the prosecutors should not be allowed to learn of confidential or attorneyclient privileged information.
171 "An alien defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is satisfied if
defense counsel advises the client that a conviction might have immigration
consequences, that immigration law is a specialized field, that the attorney is not an
immigration lawyer, and that the client should consult an immigration specialist if
the client wants advice on the subject." Padilla,559 U.S. 356, 387-8.
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circumstances and the client provides informed consent,172 a criminal
lawyer following Padilla cannot limit the scope of representation.
Where the Supreme Court holds that immigration advisals must be
given, it is not reasonable under the circumstances for counsel not to
provide this advice. Moreover, I would be hard-pressed to believe that
a client would provide informed consent for their lawyer to opt out of
competence and of the knowledge and skill for which the lawyer is
being paid.
E. Repeal of Pre-PadillaStatutes RequiringImmigration Advisals

The Cronic court' 73 refers to circumstances of a sufficient
magnitude that produce presumed prejudice even when competent
counsel is present to assist the accused.174 Because immigration
advisals by defense counsel are the current active constitutional
mandate,17 5 state statutes requiring state courts to provide immigration
advisals that were passed pre-Padillal76 are no longer necessary and
will create confusion. I advocate for their repeal, 7 7 as they may create
circumstances that amount to presumed prejudice.

172 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 1.2(c) (2011).
Cronic,466 U.S. 648.
On March 25, 1931 in rural Alabama, seven black defendants were
arrested with the capital offense of rape of women who just so happened to be white.
Six days before trial, the trial judge appointed "all members of the bar" for purposes
of arraignment. On the day of trial, only one lawyer from Tennessee appeared but
stated that he had not had an opportunity to prepare the case or to familiarize himself
with local procedure on such short notice. The trial court resolved the issue by
appointing the Tennessee lawyer with whatever assistance that the local bar could
provide. The record reflected that the proceedings from beginning to end took place
in an atmosphere of tense, hostile, and excited public sentiment. The Supreme Court
held that such designation of counsel as was attempted was either so indefinite or so
close upon the trial as to amount to a denial of the effective assistance of counsel
without examining the actual performance of counsel at trial. Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
17
In Padilla, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel requires lawyers to inform
their clients of pertinent and potential immigration consequences regarding criminal
convictions. Padilla,559 U.S. 356.
173
174

76

Id., fn.15.

See, Vivian Chang, Where Do We Go From Here: Plea Colloquy Warnings
and Immigration Consequences Post Padilla,45 U.MICH. J. L. REFORM, 189 (2011),
for criticism of broad judicial immigration warnings.
177
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Moreover, federal courts should not enter into this foray because
they only need to be certain that a plea is knowing and voluntary. 7 8
Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 11179 requires federal judges to
determine whether a defendant's guilty plea is entered knowingly and
voluntarily' 8 0 and Boykin v. Alabama' 8 ' enshrined Rule 11 protections
as constitutional rights applicable to state criminal proceeding.182
Padilla does not require the state or federal courts to provide any
specific immigration legal advice to a defendant. Because the Supreme
Court has also recently decided that a court's immigration
admonishments cannot cure a lawyer's unprofessional errors and
prejudice,183 court immigration admonishments are not relevant and
waste precious court time.
At the time of its decision, Padilla identified over twenty states
which required a state court judge to provide some type of
immigration admonishment.184 For example, the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure Rule 26.13(a)(4) provides:
Prior to accepting a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo
contendere, the court shall admonish the defendant of: [...]

(4) the fact that if the defendant is not a citizen of the
United States of America, a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere for the offense charged may result in
deportation, the exclusion from admission to this country,
or the denial of naturalization under federal law.' 8 5
In State v Aguilar,18 6 the appellant was challenging his April 2005
cocaine conviction on the basis that his attorney did not advise him of
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
"9 Fed. R. Crim. P.11.
178

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941);
Kercheval v. U.S., 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
180

181 Boykin

v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11; Boykin, 395 U.S. 238, 239 (1969).
183 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376
(2012). See, Danielle Marie Lang, Padilla v Kentucky, The Effect of Plea Colloquy
Warnings on the Defendant's Ability to Bring Successful Padilla Claims, 121 YALE.
L. J. 944 (2012).
184 Padilla, 559 U.S. 356,
fn.15.
182

185

TEX CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13

Aguilar v. State, 375 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. App. 2012) petition for discretionary review granted, judgment vacated, 393 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)
(vacated on grounds of timing).
186

69

the mandatory deportation consequences of his plea of guilt. The
Appellee argued that the "may result" language in the Texas statute
met the advisals constitutionally mandated under Padilla.The Houston
Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellant and held that the "may
result" language was insufficient to meet Padilla's higher
"presumptively mandatory deportation" advisals.18 7 Arguably, "may
result" was misadvice as deportation for cocaine possession was
presumptively mandatory.
In September 2012, the Judicial Conference of the United States
approved an amendment to Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 11 and
forwarded the proposed amendment to the Supreme Court for its
consideration. The amendment adds provision "0"to Rule 11(b)(1),
requiring federal court judges to provide immigration advisals. The
proposed amendment provides: "[T]hat if convicted, a defendant who
is not a United States citizen may be removed from the United States,
denied citizenship, and denied admission to the United States in the
future." As the Houston Court of Appeals held, the "may be removed"
language is not exacting and may lead to mis-advice. These boilerplate
advisals mandate a generic warning, not specific advice concerning the
defendant's situation. These advisals serve no purpose, and can
possibly interfere with the defense counsel's competent representation.
For example, in Padilla, I believe that Justice Stevens was
mocking the lawyer because he did not read the text of the statute: "as
anyone who could read would know that pleading to drug trafficking is
a deportable offense." 89 But where Texas includes the term "offer to
sell" in its drug delivery statute and the term offer to sell is not in the
federal drug trafficking statute, one is not deportable as an aggravated
felon for a Texas offer to sell drugs offense. In other words, if one
pleads guilty to a part of any state statute that is not part of the
narrower federal statute, one does not fit within the text of the statute

and is not deportable.1 90
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Padilla,559 U.S. 356.

1 REP. OF THE PROC. OF THE JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S. (Sept. 11, 2012)
189 Padilla,559 U.S.
356.
190 See, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (B); see, e.g., U.S. v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d
712, 716 (5th Cir. 2007). In Gonzales, the Fifth Circuit held that a Texas conviction
for delivery of a controlled substance did not meet the definition of a drug trafficking
crime for criminal sentence enhancement purposes. Id., 716. The Texas statute for
delivery of a controlled substance included the term "offering to sell," which was not
an element of the federal drug trafficking offense. Id., 714-15. As such, the court
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Where Texas or proposed Federal Criminal Procedure Rule
11(b)(1)(0) requires courts to provide boiler plate language that the
conviction "may result" in deportation' 9 ' in every criminal case and
where competent counsel provides accurate immigration advise that
deportation would not, we have conflicting advice between competent
counsel and a court. A possible result is a judge who might induce a
jury trial unnecessarily with the "may result" language, after a
constitutionally effective lawyer advised that it would not.1 9 2 In other
words, following a state or federal judge's advisals that deportation
"may result," a confused defendant might seek a jury trial and hope for
an acquittal rather than follow his competent lawyer's advice.
Of course, I am arguing that the constitutional mandates apply and
that effective criminal counsel provide accurate immigration advice
which a judge can only determine after gathering the requisite facts,
conducting immigration research, determining what the client's
objectives are and learning the requisite confidential information. I do
not believe that this it is practical or feasible for the state court to
simultaneously represent the defendant who already has counsel.
However, I would allow immigration advisals, even incomplete
advisals, by a Texas state court where the Sixth Amendment
traditionally does not attach.19 3 While Texas currently requires its state
court judges to provide boilerplate immigration advisals following a
conviction, the state statute does not apply to misdemeanors.' 94
Returning to my Texas drug paraphernalia example' 9 5 where counsel
is not provided because the Sixth Amendment does not attach and no
one is available to advise the defendant that they can be deported for a
class C Texas misdemeanor, the boilerplate language might serve a
purpose.

deemed the state statute broader than the federal statute and it did not consider the
petitioner an aggravated felon for the mere offer to sell.
'9' The fact that if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States of
America, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for the offense charged may result in
deportation, the exclusion from admission to this country, or the denial of
naturalization under federal law. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(4).
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Some advice might be better than none.
194 McGuire v. State, 617 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981); Ex parte
Davis, 748 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Tex. App. 1988) (pet. refd). Exparte Aranda v. State,
01-95-00040-CR, 1995 WL 593082 (Tex. App. Oct. 5, 1995).
19 See, supra pp.14-15.
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Among other things, the proposed amendment to Federal Criminal
Procedure Rule 11 would also require a federal judge to provide the
generic advisals without first determining the defendant's
citizenship.1 96 In comparison, Texas' criminal procedure statute also
does not require a court to first determine citizenship, but advises
generically "if you are not a citizen."' 9 7 Unfortunately, in practice
judges in Texas frequently request the citizenship of the defendant
during the plea colloquy when making the immigration admonishment,
and that this information is often placed into the record. As a result,
alienage might also find its way into the federal court record as
well.198
In immigration proceedings, proving alienage is a burden of the
government.199 A plea colloquy is a "critical stage of trial" and
criminal defense counsel cannot allow its client to answer the question
of alienage under the premise of violating the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.200 Here, a client who makes an admission
that they are pleading guilty to an offense and admittedly are not
citizens, can have that admission against self- interest used against
them in a subsequent civil immigration removal proceeding. Under the
circumstances, how does a competent lawyer tell his client to ignore
the court's admonishments as incorrect and not to answer the question
regarding their nationality?
No court should provide immigration admonishments but if
judicial immigration admonishments are given, courts should only
advise that one has the right to counsel and that if the defendant wants
See, REP. OF PROC. OF THE JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S. 3 (SEPTEMBER 11,
2012)
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings/
Proceedings.aspx?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/judconf/proceedings/2012-09.pdf.
1 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a)(4).
198 On Thursday, April 4, 2013, former Chief Justice Edith Jones of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, revealed that alienage is often
part of a pre-sentence report during a continuing legal education conference on
immigration law held on the campus of Thurgood Marshall School of Law.
199 Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
200 No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminalcase to be a witness
against himself nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. Amend. V (emphasis added).
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immigration advice then that same counsel has a constitutional duty to
provide that advice.
CONCLUSION

The right to counsel in immigration removal proceedings is
undoubtedly important. However, the extension of Gideon to alien
defendants, in civil removal proceedings at this point, is only an
idealization that does not cure the unprofessional immigration errors
that occurred during the preceding criminal proceedings. With the
addition of Padillato already constitutionally-mandated free appointed
counsel and "effective assistance of counsel," alien defendants might
entirely avoid immigration removal proceedings through creative plea
bargains.
With the application of presumed prejudice subsequent to Padilla,
criminal defense attorneys cannot avoid providing effective
immigration aid, whether it be through limiting the scope of
representation, or even remaining silent in regards to immigration
consequences. Being that criminal and immigration laws are
inextricably intertwined, it is logical for a criminal defense attorney's
strategy to be crafted to avoid any immigration consequences
subsequent to the criminal conviction and/or preserve immigration
relief when possible. Criminal defense attorneys who can avoid the
removal proceeding entirely provide the best defense for removal. Due
to deportation being a harsh penalty in addition to a lack of counsel in
immigration cases, the right to effective immigration aid through
appointed counsel will be promoted through interpretation of
presumed prejudice.
The Supreme Court has confirmed that judicial admonishments
concerning immigration do not overcome the presumption of prejudice
that occurs from counsel that does not provide effective immigration
aid. The plea colloquy under the Fifth Amendment and assistance of
counsel under the Sixth are entirely different. The court, as a neutral
arbiter, cannot act to replace effective assistance of counsel in regard
to immigration. The criminal defense attorney, not the court, is privy
to the facts and has a confidential relationship with his client. Judicial
admonishments would hinder counsel's relationship with his client and
provide a guise of protection to the alien defendant. The criminal
defense attorney, first and foremost, has a duty to his client to provide
for the best defense including subsequent immigration consequences.
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Attorneys aware of the presumed prejudice doctrine promote effective
immigration assistance while using the avenues Padillaleft open.
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